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The First Amendment – which guarantees the right to freedom of religion, of the press, to
assemble, and petition to the government for redress of grievances – is under attack at
institutions of higher learning in the United States of America. Beginning in the late
1980s, universities have crafted “speech codes” or “codes of conduct” that prohibit on
campus certain forms of expression that would otherwise be constitutionally guaranteed.
Examples of such polices could include prohibiting “telling a joke that conveys sexism,”
or “content that may negatively affect an individual’s self-esteem.” Despite the alarming
number of institutions that employ such policies, administrative and student attitude
toward repeal or ensuring their free-speech rights are intact is arguably lax. Some
scholars even suggest that colleges’ prohibitions are welcome, and are a product of a
generation of students rejecting the tolerance of hate speech. Court cases and precedent
disagree, though, and various prominent rulings are discussed that have shaped the
landscape of conduct codes in today’s academia. Also described are examples and
outcomes of academic prosecution of students by school officials for constitutionally
protected speech, opinion, expression or conduct. More research is imperative before
occurrence of a culture shift that eradicates expression and topics of discussion and
criminally prosecutes speech outside of the talking points of an ivory tower echo chamber
of approved opinions.
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Chapter One – A BRIEF HISTORY, DEFINITIONS AND LITERATURE
REVIEW OF UNIVERSITY SPEECH CODES.
American tradition holds that freedom of speech is the cornerstone of intellectual
discourse. Theoretically, no other place or establishment should be more committed to
the concept and promotion of intellectual discourse than an institution of higher learning.
The United States of America offers protection to the moral and ethical freedoms of
debate and open conversation with the First Amendment to the Constitution, which
explicitly states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
But why is freedom of speech so important? In his 1859 “On Liberty,” considered
one of the most authoritative texts on free speech, John Stuart Mill rests its essentiality on
one vital fact: All opinions must be protected because anyone could be wrong. Mill also
argues that even when we’re right, the allowance and consideration of alternate
viewpoints can refine our own beliefs and recognize in detail specifically why we believe
the way we do. In short, any argument may hold a kernel of truth, but even without that,
our beliefs can still be strengthened.1
No discussion of the First Amendment would be complete without two notable
quotes from U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote both that,
“The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market”2 and that “if there is any principle of the Constitution that more
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imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is the principle of free thought - not
free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”3
Despite the First Amendment’s clarity, both at face value and from courtroom
interpretation, a majority of universities in the United States still cling to restrictions and
codes on speech that violate constitutional principles, seemingly without regard for
speech-chilling ramifications or the possibility that such codes teach the nation’s future
leaders that censorship is a positive quality. Because more Americans either hold or are
pursuing a college degree than ever before, understanding of individuals’ rights is crucial
to future deliberation.4
Indeed, the concept of “free speech” is arguably taught as the enemy of social
progress –instead of as something that is fundamental to learning. Greg Lukianoff,
president of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), which will be
discussed shortly, writes in “Unlearning Liberty”:
I remember telling a New York University film student that I
worked for free speech on campus and being shocked by his response:
‘Oh, so you’re like the people who want the KKK on campus.’ In his
mind, protecting free speech was apparently synonymous with advocating
hatred.5
This attitude from young adults quickly bleeds into the dialogue of the nation, and
potentially could alter the way discussion is executed.
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Interestingly, however, since the inception of various speech codes in American
universities in the late 1980s and ‘90s6, research suggests that campus administrators are
overstepping their bounds in facilitating civil discourse and are violating the First
Amendment in the process. While likely well-intentioned, university speech codes chill
free speech by threatening punishment or censorship for offenses as vague as “any action
that is motivated by bias”7 or as blatantly unconstitutional as a ban on “sexually,
ethnically, racially, or religiously offensive messages.”8 Of course, as with all First
Amendment discourse, administrators at public colleges have the ability to place time,
place, and manner restrictions on some speech if the restrictions are, according to Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, content neutral, narrowly tailored, serve a significant governmental
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication.9 For example, a
protest cannot substantially restrict the day-to-day functionality of a university, wherein
students prevent others from attending class or take over an administrative building.
Demonstrations on university campuses are nothing unique to the last couple
decades; anti-war protests – in which many were punished by administrations and law
enforcement for both speech and action – were frequent during the Vietnam War era.
Ironically, many university administrators today were attending institutions of higher
learning in the era when free-speech concerns dominated campus.10 Perhaps this is a
result in the shift of the political spectrum; since the late 1980s, censorship on campus
6

The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education. Spotlight on Speech Codes 2013. Philadelphia: The
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, 2013. PDF. p.6
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has often been treated as a “conservative issue” because the opinions most likely to be
stifled at universities generally align with a socially conservative belief system. Simply
put, a student is more likely to be punished by administration for opposing gay marriage,
abortion and affirmative action than he or she is for supporting these topics. This
situation will become evident during the examination of individual punishment cases in
the following chapters. Typical censorship scenarios are not always based on political
ideology specifically, though one study shows other factors may go hand in hand.
Christians, who are typically cast as having more socially “conservative” values, are the
only group that a majority of faculty were comfortable to admit evoked strong negative
feelings in them, according to a 2007 study of attitudes on religion by the Institute for
Jewish and Community Research. The survey found that Jews and Buddhists were most
commonly favored by faculty, followed by Muslims. Mormons also tended to receive
fairly negative reviews.11
The consequences of censoring opinions more typical of one side of the political
spectrum is a great cause for concern – though not exactly surprising – in today’s
political climate. Extensive studies have shown that the weight of America’s growing
political polarization is more increased than in eras past, as technology has advanced to
the point where individuals are able to intake content through cyber environments
wherein likeminded people confirm pre-existing opinions, causing an echo chamber that
leaves no room for new thoughts and ideas.12 Sociologist Diana C. Mutz has confirmed
this in her studies, writing that those with the highest level of education have the lowest
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levels of exposure to people with viewpoints in opposition to their own. Conversely,
those who have not even graduated from high school are subjected to the largest amount
of differing viewpoints and diverse discussion.13
Perhaps, though, the belief in censorship isn’t indoctrinated in college but before;
of 100,000 high school students surveyed by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation
in 2004, 73 percent either felt ambivalent about the First Amendment or took it for
granted.14 In “Academically Adrift,” Richard Arum and Josipa Roksa found that 45
percent of students show almost no improvement in “critical thinking, analytical
reasoning, problem solving and writing,” during their time in college. They also found
that very few students knew how to “make” or “break” an argument. Students in schools
of education and social work showed the lowest improvement in critical-thinking skills,
with business students not far behind. Those in the math and science fields showed
greatest improvement.15
Greg Lukianoff surmises that professors and administrators in departments of
social work and education are most likely to attempt to indoctrinate their students – or at
least encourage them in the same manners of thinking – and hence retard their ability to
think critically. “And if that is the case for those we are training to teach the next
generation, the prospects for future generations appreciating the rigorous philosophy of
free speech and free minds are bleak indeed,” Lukianoff writes.16
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One of the foremost organizations defending First Amendment rights on
university campuses is the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE). FIRE
defines speech codes as, “[A]ny university regulation or policy that prohibits expression
that would be protected by the First Amendment in society at large. Any policy—such as
a harassment policy, a student conduct code, or a posting policy—can be a speech code if
it prohibits protected speech or expression.”17 Each year, FIRE releases a comprehensive
study that grades universities’ speech policies. FIRE awards three classifications to
universities based on the following criteria:
1. Red Light - A red-light institution is one that has at least one policy that both
clearly and substantially restricts freedom of speech, or that bars public access to
its speech-related policies by requiring a university login and password for access.
2. Yellow Light - A yellow-light institution maintains policies that could be
interpreted to suppress protected speech or policies that, while clearly restricting
freedom of speech, affect only narrow categories of speech.
3. Green Light – If FIRE finds that a university’s policies do not seriously threaten
campus expression, that college or university receives a green light. A green light
does not necessarily mean that a school actively supports free expression; it
simply means that the school’s written policies do not pose a serious threat to free
speech.18
In the “Spotlight on Speech Codes 2013,” FIRE rated 305 public institutions and
104 private institutions (409 total); 62.1 percent received a Red Light ranking, 32 percent
a Yellow Light ranking and only 3.7 percent a Green Light rating. Nine schools (2.2
17

"What Are Speech Codes?" Thefire.org. The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, n.d. Web. 8
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percent) were not ranked, as they had consistently expressed their own standards that
hold its members above a commitment of free speech (military institutions, for example,
qualify under this section)19. This means that an alarming 94.1 percent of surveyed
universities – most of which are among the largest in the nation – have speech codes
FIRE found in violation of the First Amendment, theoretically allowing university
administrators to dole out punishments for speech at their subjective discretion. The good
news, however, is that the number of Red Light universities has dropped 12.9 percent
from its 75 percent amount five years ago.20
FIRE is not the only group claiming that unpopular opinions are under siege in the
academic environment. In 2010, the Association of American Colleges found in a study
of 24,000 students that only about 30 percent of college seniors agreed strongly with the
statement: “It is safe to have unpopular views on campus.” Only 16.7 percent of faculty –
those who typically understand the academic system the best and who have been around
the longest – agreed with that statement. 21
The first prominent speech code to be struck down in court was the University of
Michigan’s “Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment of Students in the
University Environment” in the 1989 case Doe v. University of Michigan.22 Like other
universities, Michigan adopted a speech code in 1988 after a series of efforts to quell and
discourage racism, homophobia, sexism, and other alleged persecutions of minority

19

Ibid. p.5-6
Ibid.
21
Dey, E.L., Ott, M.C., Antonaros, M., Barnhard, C.L., and Holsapple, M.A. (2010) Engaging Diverse
Viewpoints: What Is the Campus Climate for Perspective-Taking? Washington, D.C.: Association of
American Colleges and Universities, 2010, available online.
22
Doe v. Michigan. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich 1989).
20

8
groups. While on campus, students could be punished for displaying the following
behaviors:
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status….
2. Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical conduct that
stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of sex or sexual
orientation….23
An accompanying guide soon followed the policy, which provided an example of
sanctionable behaviors and conduct qualifying as “harassment,” which included:
1. A male student makes remarks in class like "Women just aren't as good in this
field as men," thus creating a hostile learning atmosphere for female classmates.
2. Male students leave pornographic pictures and jokes on the desk of a female
graduate student.
3. You display a confederate flag on the door of your room in the residence hall.
4. You laugh at a joke about someone in your class who stutters.24
A psychology graduate student, known in the court report as John Doe,
challenged the policy, arguing that the policy would effectively ban classroom
discussions about the biological differences between men and women. Michigan
responded by saying that “legitimate” ideas were not sanctionable, effectively relegating
to administrators the arbitrary definition of legitimacy. The university argued that First
Amendment freedoms would not be violated despite the policy, although evidence that

23
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the school prosecuted multiple students existed, including a graduate student for
expressing an opinion involving homosexuality as a curable disease in the context of
academia. Because of these reasons as well as the policy’s overbroad qualities and
vagueness, the Eastern District Court of Michigan ruled the university’s policy
unconstitutional.25 Additional cases in the courts deciding university speech codes will be
discussed in a further chapter.
The most recent – and likely, most appalling – federal act occurred in May 2013,
when the U.S. Departments of Justice and Education sent a letter (referred to as a
“blueprint” in its content) to the University of Montana addressing the school’s handling
of sexual harassment claims. The blueprint argued for a more “broadly defined”
definition of sexual assault to include “any unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature.”26
With this letter, the federal government has potentially labeled a vast majority of college
students as sexual harassment perpetrators with definitions that seemingly target male
students. This document is also seemingly a completely turnaround from a 2003 open
letter titled “Dear Colleague” from the Department of Education’s Office for Civil
Rights. Around that time, the abuse by universities of harassment codes became so
rampant the OCR had to issue a statement that reminded administrators that, “No OCR
regulation should be interpreted to impinge upon the rights protected under the Frist
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or to require recipients to enact or enforce codes that
punish the exercise of such rights” and stated that punishment for free speech, “[M]ust
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include something beyond the mere expression of views, words, symbols or thoughts that
some person finds offensive.”27
Simply put, university administration in some capacity is generally responsible
for creating most incidents of censorship, though the exact reasons may vary. Ironically,
for example, when a code is in place to prevent bullying or harassment, administrators
have been found to use that code to punish those who have spoken out against, mocked or
criticized them. This theory leaves open the possibility for students to be tricked into
supporting rules that ultimately only protect those in power. In “Kindly Inquisitors,”
Jonathan Rauch compares many speech code policies and their enforcement to
fundamentalism and former rulers who dominated by persecuting those whose ideas were
different based on the rulers’ own interpretation of the truth: Islamic theocrats, Egyptian
pharaohs, Chinese emperors, divine-right kings of Europe, the head priests of the
Mayans, Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler. Fundamentalist systems traditionally have been
characterized as punishing or destroying people in defense of calcified ideas.28 The
parallels between these systems and the speech code discussion is somewhat alarming,
though perhaps extreme.
Another reason often given for censorship at universities is the overriding goal of
making everyone feel comfortable. Comfortable minds are not thinking minds, however,
and the core of this rationale is one often made an afterthought. One’s feelings or
emotions are not substantial enough to qualify as a serious argument, but rather a

27
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subjective state one can control or choose to ignore. As being offended is an emotional
state, it is insufficient to use an excuse to stifle debate.29
As these rationale and further examples will show, university administrators are
blatantly inconsistent with applying speech codes. Many codes are so broad that a large
body of students and faculty could be found guilty of infractions multiple times a day. Of
course, expulsion en masse of students across the country for making jokes would cause
an uproar, so I don’t of punishing unpopular, unwanted or critical speech.
But what’s the harm in these codes, then, if they are simply “on the books” as a
deterrent to potentially hurtful speech? They create a chilling effect, for one, wherein
people will abstain from speech they know could cause controversy or be punished.
Students will refrain from raising serious discussion topics around anyone but likeminded people, creating a polarized environment where everyone’s intellectual growth is
stifled. They also miseducate students about free speech, their rights, the rights of others,
and what it means to live in a pluralist democracy.30 Opponents may devise nightmare
scenarios for examples, citing minority students being chased off campus by an angry
mob of racists. These are usually examples of action― not speech― and action is not
constitutionally protected to begin with.
A financial burden is also to be considered when dealing with First Amendment
rights on campus. In the state of our litigious society, universities look to find a low-risk
balance between harassment and free-speech lawsuits. Because harassment and
discrimination lawsuits are much more costly than the comparatively rare First
Amendment case, attorneys argue that a broad speech code may be enough to point to
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during litigation to prove that “offensive speech” was prohibited all along. 31 In “Higher
Education?” Andrew Hacker and Claudia Dreifus affirm that colleges are society’s mostsued institution after hospitals, which contributes to an overly cautious, overly regulated
atmosphere hostile to free speech.32
With a broad, basic understanding of the climate of speech codes and potential
violation of First Amendment rights on U.S. colleges, we can now inspect the arguments
for speech codes, review relevant cases decided in the courts, and study a collection of
university-specific incidents that illustrate the girth and breadth of recorded censorship
incidents. The universities chosen for this study, DePaul University, Harvard University,
University of Alabama, University of Central Florida, University of Colorado at Boulder,
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and
University of Oklahoma, were chosen specifically for the number of incidents recorded
or published in various forms of media that accurately depicts the range of
constitutionally suspect actions universities can take against speech. Though it’s noted
some of the aforementioned colleges are private institutions and not formally subject to
the Constitution, these elite universities also claim complete adherence to the First
Amendment and formally recognize the value of unhindered discourse. For example,
Harvard’s “Free Speech Guidelines” state:
Free speech is uniquely important to the University because we are
a community committed to reason and rational discourse. Free interchange
of ideas is vital for our primary function of discovering and disseminating
ideas through research, teaching, and learning. Curtailment of free speech
undercuts the intellectual freedom that defines our purpose. It also
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deprives some individuals of the right to express unpopular views and
others of the right to listen to unpopular views.33

Through this analysis, we can see how university speech codes negatively affect
freedom of speech and diminish the fruitful discourse expected of higher-learning
institutions by providing a comprehensive examination of the nature of said codes and
paving the way for future quantitative research.
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Chapter Two – THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF SPEECH CODES
The majority of university speech codes today contain a similar theme: the
prevention of “hate speech.” Hate speech traditionally is defined as verbal attacks that
target people on the basis of their immutable or deeply ingrained characteristics, or any
form of “speech attacks based on race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation or
preference.”34 Hate speech, which has never ultimately been upheld as legal under the
First Amendment (minus provisions on incitement)35, is, of course, not to be confused
with hate crimes. Hate crime legislation imposes a penalty enhancement in the instance a
victim is selected because of his or her “race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry,”36 though the legality, efficacy and morality of
such impositions are a discussion all of their own. Essentially, a person can legally eject a
racist tirade, but cannot attack another on the basis of race or a smattering of other
qualities. A convicted suspect may, for instance, receive a higher penalty for a crime
committed against another while uttering epithets regarding that person’s physical or
mental makeup.
Perhaps surprisingly, the United States is virtually alone among Western
democracies in abstaining from holding or enforcing laws prohibiting hate speech.37 For
example, German law punishes expression that incites racial hatred,38 and the Canadian
Supreme Court has upheld prohibitions on hate speech directed against groups who have
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faced “historical and social prejudice.”39 Historically, there have been only five cases
under which the U.S. courts are willing to restrict speech: obscenity; libel; time, place
and manner regulations; the clear and present danger test;40 and fighting words.41 Hate
speech is closely connected to the Supreme Court’s category of fighting words – those
expressions that by their very nature are likely to bring people to blows – but the two are
not completely analogous. Under the 1969 Supreme Court case Brandenburg v. Ohio,
direct incitement imminent of lawless action or speech likely to do so was found
unconstitutional rather than mere advocacy of violence.42
How does relate to the academic environment? Consider the example of a
professor or student in a history class who wants to discuss use and historical connotation
of the word “nigger.” The individual’s purpose is presumably not to offend members of
the community, but rather to explore a contentious subject – a quality that has virtue at a
university that some in the audience could find insensitive or provocative. The ensuing
discussion would differ in context from the person who cries, “The niggers on campus
should go back to Africa,”43 which is a verbal attack on African Americans on the basis
of race. Herein lies the heart of the debate on the constitutionality of hateful speech at the
American university. Constitutionally, both of these examples should be protected, both
in and outside a college community. But it is hate speech (not action) that is generally
restricted by many university speech codes. At these institutions, administrators are
essentially defining morality and ethics, and forcing all students to comply with this
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definition. The policy and guidelines could be overly broad and vague enough to prevent
expression of unpopular opinions, and the tenets are unlikely to be narrowly tailored
enough to reduce likelihood of chilling constitutionally protected speech.
A historical example of the way hate speech is prohibited on campus comes from
the early days of university speech codes. In 1993, Pennsylvania freshman Eden
Jacobowitz was studying in his dormitory when sorority sisters of an African American
sorority began celebrating their founders’ day outside the building. Like other students in
the area, Jacobowitz asked the women to cease from their activities so he could
concentrate on his homework, but was ignored. At wit’s end, he eventually shouted,
“Shut up, you water buffalo! If you want to party, there’s a zoo a mile from here.” Of
importance is that Jacobowitz is a graduate of a yeshiva, or religious Jewish school, and a
rough translation of the Hebrew insult “behema” is “water buffalo.” But, because a water
buffalo is an animal found in Africa, the women took offense and argued he insinuated
black women belong in a zoo.44
The University of Pennsylvania accused Jacobowitz of violating the university’s
policy against insulting or demeaning a person on the basis of race, and he was brought
up on charges, despite Penn’s policy requiring an affirmative intention by the speaker to
“direct injury.” Jacobowitz rejected the university’s judicial inquiry officer’s “plea deal,”
which would require him to find rehabilitation or face a judicial hearing with the possible
punishment of suspension or expulsion, and hired a team of lawyers to defend him.
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Jacobowitz and his team created a public relations nightmare for Penn, and four months
later all charges were dropped. Two years later, Penn removed its speech policy.45
Similarly, in 1990 Brown University expelled junior Douglas Hann after he
spewed an epithet-laden rant while stumbling home from his 21st birthday celebration,
likely intoxicated. In front of others he disparaged “niggers,” “faggots” and “fucking
Jews” simultaneously, and his identity was soon discovered and his classmates filed a
complaint against him with the student disciplinary council.46 Hann was convicted of
harassment and expelled from the school. The case received national attention when The
New York Times reported on the story, but Brown’s then-president, Vartan Gregorian,
stood by the university’s decision, stating that Hann’s speech violated the policy against
“abusive, threatening or demeaning actions.”47
Not all scholars agree that the majority of university speech codes are
unconstitutional – nor that the public does not want them. For example, Joshua Press,
with the Northwestern University School of Law, agrees that an institution of higher
learning should be committed to accepting a diverse array of ideals, though he argues that
student dormitories should be included as a nonpublic forum,48 as are K-12 public
schools, jails and military bases. Regardless, speech must always be regulated in a
content-neutral manner. Press argues the state’s overriding interest in “attempting to
create a safe, calm, and hospitable living environment that is conducive to learning”
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prohibits right to speak offensively.49 Students living in such dormitories are essentially a
“captive audience” to negative speech, and therefore must have anti-harassment policies
established to ensure they feel safe participating in the “marketplace of ideas.”50
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Widmar v. Vincent in 1981 that for
students, the university is part of a public forum.51
Press is not the only scholar who contends that colleges are within their rights to
create speech codes. Jon Gould rationalizes and defines their necessity by saying, “Where
an individual seeks a legitimate debate, even on controversial questions, his message
should not count as hate speech. But when the purpose is to offend, to silence, to
marginalize, then speech becomes hateful.”52 Under Gould’s proposition, however, it
could be argued that too much room for subjectivity is allowed under what is “offensive,”
and actions under the guise of “speech” intended to silence are rarely allowed itself, as
will be discussed later.
Gould also argues that FIRE’s claim of 94.1 percent of schools with
unconstitutional speech codes is alarmist and an exaggeration. Using a random, stratified
sample of 100 four-year institutions, Gould found that between 1987 and 1992, almost
one-third of American colleges and universities adopted a hate speech code. Of these, 1
percent of institutions adopted policies against fighting words, 15 percent banned generic
verbal harassment, 14 percent prohibited verbal harassment against groups, and four
percent punished offensive speech. Nearly 500 schools initiated speech policies, and all
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within four to five years of one another, statistically appropriate to label a trend.53 Based
on this data, Gould suggests only that those schools that adopted restrictions on
“offensive speech” truly had unconstitutional qualities in 1987. In 1992, R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul redrew constitutional boundaries, ruling that prohibitions on verbal
harassment of groups were unconstitutional if they singled out certain ethnic, racial,
religious or gender groups for protection.54 But regardless, the two categories of
prohibited speech codes encompassed just 18 percent of American colleges and
universities. Excluding private universities only 1. 5 percent of these schools adopted
speech policies that transgressed the First Amendment, Gould said.55
To counter Gould, however, it can be argued that compared to FIRE’s findings,
Gould’s smaller study does not accurately account for the sheer number of students
attending these institutions where illegal codes are in place. Gould’s sampling is random,
but FIRE discusses and analyzes nearly 500 of the largest schools in the country. The
percentage of schools with an unconstitutional policy may seem small compared to the
large number of colleges in the nation, but the number of students attending said schools
seems to sway the balance in favor of FIRE’s findings.
Gould says many of FIRE’s findings are derived from misleading passages in
some universities’ codes. He says, “FIRE does not distinguish between enforceable rules
and exhortative statements; it confuses examples with definitions; and it takes statements
out of context.”56 Gould points to FIRE’s claim that the University of Michigan’s Policy
and Guidelines Regarding Electronic Access to Potentially Offensive Material is
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unconstitutional for stating, “Individuals should not be unwittingly exposed to offensive
material by the deliberate and knowing acts of others.” While one’s knee-jerk reaction
may be to lament its unconstitutionality, the policy applies only to computer systems
administrators, not to students or faculty. Later in the policy, Michigan shows favor to
First Amendment rights, stating, “System administrators will have to guard against
making judgments as to the appropriateness of the content of another person’s work.
Research and instruction take many forms and may not be restricted through
censorship.”57 Even well-known advocates like Robert O’Neil, director of the Thomas
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression and former president of the
University of Virginia, have expressed their doubt about FIRE’s claims. O’Neil remarks,
“I just can’t believe there are anything like that number of genuine (unconstitutional)
speech codes.”58
Thor Halvorssen, former CEO of FIRE and current CEO of the Human Rights
Foundation, said in a 2002 interview with the Washington Post Magazine that FIRE
“doesn’t oppose private college speech codes if the rule makers are honest about them,”
but at public schools they are “manifestly unconstitutional.”59 The codes’ early opponents
during the late 1980s and early ‘90s, however, neglected the technical legality of hate
speech policies and instead attempted to spread alarm at what they viewed as academic
elites creating “thought control” and censorship through breakdown of free expression.60
That thinking continued in the same vein to propose that if an influx of college students
could be persuaded to adopt and accept social equality values (at the expense of free
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speech values), new waves of speech regulation could occur in mainstream society and
legal realms after the students graduate and mature.61 Gould’s study reflects this
sentiment, as he connected the speech codes to schools that were prestigious and
selective, had experience anti-apartheid protest, maintained black or minority studies
departments, sponsored gay/lesbian organizations, enrolled graduate students and fulltime undergraduates, and employed few female faculty. Apart from the curious, negative
connection to the percentage of female faculty, these results are consistent with the
critics’ theory of the speech codes.62 There is additional research that links a college’s
prestige to the liberalness of its faculty (and presumably its students).63 And so hate
speech measures became a trend in higher education, a badge of honor for schools,
showcasing their commitment to social progress. If schools like Michigan and Stanford
could adopt these policies, so too could any state college with national ambitions.
It looked like the beginning of the end of speech prohibitions on campus in March
1995, when the California superior court confirmed what four other courts before it had
ruled – that collegiate hate speech codes (specifically Stanford’s, in this case) were
constitutionally suspect.64 Another study by Jon Gould, however, found the opposite to
be true. The year 1997 saw a jump in surveyed universities with speech codes. Of the 100
universities previously surveyed, 54 percent had no speech policy and the other 46
percent allocated thus: 4 percent centered on fighting words, 19 percent verbal
harassment, 11 percent verbal harassment against minorities and 12 percent against

61

Ibid., p. 79.
Ibid., p. 85.
63
See Ladd Jr., E.C. and Lipset, S.M. (1975). The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
64
Corry v. Stanford University, No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 27, 1995)
62

22
offensive speech, variations of minus 11, 3, 4, minus 3 and 8 percent, respectively.65
Most surprisingly, following the court rulings, the number of speech policies in the most
unconstitutional category – vaguely prohibiting offensive speech – rose the sharpest, and
most schools kept or develop their policies on the books in the face of contrary legal
rulings.
Technically, only the parties to a specific lawsuit are formally required to abide
by the holding. In regards to hate speech codes, Michigan, Wisconsin, Central Michigan
and Stanford would be the only universities subject to judicial sanctions had they not
amended their policies after legal proceedings against them were complete. More
broadly, however, the rulings hypothetically should have set a tone on what will or will
not be tolerated in the academic environment. Universities were now faced with a
quandary: would they bring their policies in line with the spirit of the First Amendment,
essentially invalidating their approach, or would they fail to recognize the persuasive
authority of the courts’ decisions?
Jon Gould examined universities’ reactions and estimated that nationwide, 14
percent kept offending policies, 9 percent adopted an offending policy, 2 percent
removed an offending policy, 17 percent kept a non-offending policy, 6 percent adopted a
non-offending policy, 0 percent removed a non-offending policy, and 51 percent
continued to have no relevant policy.66 Gould predicts that those schools employing
passive noncompliance, or the act of maintaining offending policies regardless of legal
definitions, did so out of the assumption by collegiate administration that the symbolic
advantages of keeping the suspect policies on the books outweighed the low odds that
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they would be challenged in court. Those who created policies regardless of court
decision did so, Gould suggests, by constructing policies administrators either believed
would barely skirt legal precedent or blatantly in the face of the new rulings due to the
understanding speech policies were the norm in higher education regardless of court
rulings.67
Even today, the informal law of speech regulation has prospered, despite the
outcome of legal battles in court. Could it be possible, then, that speech codes will
eventually and ultimately have an effect on future First Amendment findings? The
bounds of free speech continue to be pressed and reinterpreted despite court rulings
advocating for the contrary. Jon Gould in his study comments that policies are rarely
enforced, occurring at most once a year. He quotes a former college president, who says,
“Adopting policies is easier than acting on actual cases… Policies are non-action,” which
most college administrators prefer, he says. “The adoption does nothing.”68 Claims by
opponents of indoctrinating young adults in schools may not be accurate, as well. A
series of surveys conducted at the University of California at Los Angeles shows that
freshmen arrive at school already with anti-hate speech ideals. In a 1993 survey, 58
percent of first-year students supported hate speech regulation.69 In 1994, two thirds
approved of prohibitions,70 and by the early 2000s, the number had leveled off at around
60 percent of incoming students favoring control of hateful speech.71 Gould found that
national media trends were similar; non-existent in 1988, picked up steam, peaked in the
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mid 1990s, and tapered off by the late ‘90s.72 But, as Anna Quindlen has said, media “do
not make social policy, only reflect it once it moves convincingly from the fringe into the
mainstream.”73
Simply, proponents of hate speech regulation conclude that it has triumphed in the
face of formal constitutionalism. This is especially ironic, as traditional legal theory
suggests that formal law prevails, and the support of legal institutions must be attained to
secure constitutional rights. As Jon Gould, one of the foremost apologetics for campus
speech policy, says, “What may have begun as an instrumental, intra-academic exercise
has not been dispatched by its critics. In the early morning of a new century, the norm of
hate speech regulation has grown to challenge the formal Constitution.”74
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Chapter Three – NOTABLE U.S. COURT RULINGS ON LEGALITY OF
UNIVERSITY SPEECH CODES.
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has again ruled75 that speech may not be
prohibited just because it is offensive. The Westboro Baptist Church, founded in 1955 by
Fred Phelps, long has been under scrutiny for its offensive protests at military members’
funerals and signs expressing negativity towards the gay community.76 The U.S. Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case after the appellate court found in favor of Snyder, and
found Westboro liable for $2.9 million in damages. Snyder, whose son had died in Iraq,
claimed emotional damage from Phelps and members of his church (comprised almost
entirely of his family) picketing his son’s funeral. Westboro kept 1,000 feet away from
the church the funeral was held in, and Snyder admitted he did not see Phelps’ signs until
media reports surfaced. Chief Justice John Roberts, in the opinion, writes, "What
Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, is entitled to
'special protection' under the First Amendment and that protection cannot be overcome
by a jury finding that the picketing was outrageous."77 In essence, the courts have
repeatedly ruled that an exception to the First Amendment is not created simply because
speech is grossly offensive.
Court cases influencing university speech codes have occurred at fairly regular
intervals, beginning in the late 1980s and continuing today. Also consistent is the
seemingly constant decision by the courts in favor of the First Amendment and oncampus rights. Like any other legal issue, precedent from rulings prior to recent cases are
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often applied to determine legality and constitutionality. Below is a discussion of select
prominent court cases through the years involving and explaining the judicial makeup of
university speech code legitimacy today.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire78
During a time when fear of communism was high, prosecution of “subversive
individuals” was not uncommon. This sentiment was no different at the University of
New Hampshire, when a professor, Paul Sweezy, was subject of an investigation
conducted by a State Attorney General, acting on behalf of the State Legislature, on
whether he or his family members and associates were communists. New Hampshire
passed legislation in 1951 prohibiting “subversive persons” from working for the state,
and had Sweezy been found guilty of lecturing in favor of or believing communism,
would have likely been terminated.
Sweezy was summoned twice to appear before the attorney general, once in
January 1954 and again a few months later in June of that year. He was interrogated at
length on a multitude of subjects in attempt to discern his involvement with the
communist party. He refused, however, to respond to a number of questions that were
either impertinent to the subject under inquiry or against his First Amendment rights,
which included items like “Didn’t you tell the class…that socialism is inevitable in this
country” and “Was Charles Beebe active in the Progressive Party in New Hampshire?”79
Though Sweezy did affirm that he classified himself as a Marxist and socialist, he refused
to discuss his involvement with the Progressive Party in New Hampshire and the
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members thereof he may have been associated with in personal or professional life. The
court held him in contempt for his silence.
On appeal, the state courts upheld the contempt charge, citing New Hampshire’s
ability to investigate on an individual’s status as a “subversive person.” They found the
state had substantial interest in the content of Sweezy’s in-class lectures, as preservation
of government overrode personal freedoms, and that his teachings reflected upon his
character. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the inquiry must fall on the basis of
scrutinizing a teacher as a person. As Chief Justice Earl Warren expressively penned:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education
is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be
made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.80
Keyishian v. Board of Regents81
In 1967, four professors of the State University of New York and a librarian sued
after the act or threat of termination at the university was applied to them when they
refused to comply with the teacher loyalty laws and regulations, which they alleged were
unconstitutional. When the private University of Buffalo merged in 1962 with the SUNY,
a public institution, faculty members simultaneously became required to comply with a
New York law that, like in Sweezy, prevented the appointment or retention in state
employment of “subversive persons.” The professors – newly minted state employees –
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refused to sign a certificate required by law confirming that they were not communists, or
if they had been in the past, that the school president was aware. The librarian was not
forced to sign said certificate, but instead must take an oath affirming that he had never
promoted overthrow of the government by force, which he refused to do. When faced
with termination, the appellants sued on the basis that the laws were not in compliance
with the First Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme court agreed with the appellants, and found New York’s
Education Law prohibiting speech that is “treasonable or seditious” anti-First
Amendment. The judges concluded that subjecting teachers to the confinement of speech
that may arbitrarily violate on accident does a great disservice to academic institutions, as
do provisions requiring yearly reviews of every teacher for lectures, utterances, words
and writings of “subversive” material. Specifically, the Court affirmed the extended need
for free speech at the university level, rather than the restriction.
Justice William Brennan writes in the opinion, “Our Nation is deeply committed
to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.” He also referenced John Stuart Mill, calling the university the epitome of the
“marketplace of ideas,” and that, “The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth….”82
Healy v. James83
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Central Connecticut State College in 1969 prohibited students from forming a
local chapter of the left-leaning organization Students for a Democratic Society (SDS),
primarily on the grounds that the organization was responsible for acts of violence on
other campuses throughout the nation. When considering this case, the U.S. Supreme
Court again acknowledged the environment of free speech on campuses:
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the academic community,
we approach our task with special caution, recognizing the mutual interest
of students, faculty members, and administrators in an environment free
from disruptive interference with the educational process. We also are
mindful of the equally significant interest in the widest latitude for free
expression and debate consonant with the maintenance of order. Where
these interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made binding on
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, strikes the required balance.84
During the civil unrest common at many universities in the late 1960s and early
1970s, a number of riots and vandalism had occurred, spearheaded and led in some
instances by a branch of SDS. Using proper measures, students filed an application for
the branch of SDS to become recognized by CCSC. The Student Affairs Committee
declared the statement of purpose satisfactory, but was concerned about the image and
reputation of the National SDS organization. In response, the petitioners said they would
not affiliate with any national organization and would remain completely independent.
The committee questioned the petitioners on whether they would engage in disruption or
violence, to which the students responded they did not know, and it would be impossible
to say. The committee approved the request on the basis that other groups along the
political spectrum were recognized, but the request was later denied by CCSC president,
Don James. He said the organization’s philosophy was antithetical to the school’s
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policies and that the local group’s independence was doubtful. The students filed suit for
breach of First Amendment rights.
Though in theory the students could have met as a group totally unaffiliated with
the university, official recognition provides many benefits, including the opportunity to
place announcements regarding meetings, rallies, or other activities in the student
newspaper; using various campus bulletin boards; and the ability to use campus facilities
to hold meetings. Pursuant to a district court’s order, the Dean of Student Affairs was
assigned as a hearing officer for the students’ appeal. Again, they further affirmed that
they would be entirely independent from the national organization and even pledged to
change the name to “Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut State
College.” Their faculty adviser also testified that some SDS branches in the nation were
independent. James, however, reaffirmed his previous denial.
The Supreme Court ruled again that the First Amendment has no less application
to individuals based on their status as students or their attendance at a state university.
Borrowing from Shelton v. Tucker, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. noted in that opinion that
nowhere does court precedent say “First Amendment protections should apply with less
force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the contrary, ‘[t]he
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools.’”85 The Court also said that right of individuals to
associate to further their personal beliefs is protected by the First Amendment, and this
was infringed on, especially when the students were removed from an on-campus coffee
shop for meeting as an unrecognized group. Denial of use of campus facilities and
resources prevents the organization from remaining a viable entity in the community, and
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without the stamp of approval from administration, the petitioners’ organization would
not be able to sustain itself. The Court noted that the “wide latitude accorded by the
Constitution to the freedoms of expression and association is not without its costs in
terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and an ordered society,” and remanded the
case for reconsideration.

Papish v. University of Missouri Curators86
Barbara Papish, a 32-year-old graduate student, was expelled from the University
of Missouri School of Journalism in 1973 after distributing a newspaper on campus
“containing forms of indecent speech” in violation of a bylaw by the Board of Curators.
The specific edition of the newspaper, the Free Press Underground, was found in
violation both because it contained a cartoon (published elsewhere previously) that
depicted a police officer raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice as well
as an article titled “Motherfucker Acquitted.” The article’s title was a reference to the
assault trial and acquittal of a New York City child who identified as part of a gang
known as “Up Against the Wall, Motherfucker.” Papish was expelled following a hearing
for violating the school’s General Standards of Student Conduct, which prohibited
“indecent conduct or speech.” She brought an action against the university, found no
relief through the lower courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear her case. This
case was influenced, in part, on Cohen v. California.87 In Cohen, 19-year-old Paul Cohen
was arrested for disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket inside the Los Angeles County
Courthouse that had “Fuck the draft” written on it. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a
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simple public display of a swear word did not count as unconstitutional obscenity. In his
opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s
lyric.”88
Relying on Healy, the Court again ruled that a state university may not prohibit
the mere dissemination of ideas based on offensiveness or conventions of decency. The
Court also argued that in concurrence with recent rulings, neither the headline nor the
cartoon could legally be labelled as obscene. The Court reversed the judgment and
ordered Missouri to restore her credits and reinstate her as a graduate student.
Widmar v. Vincent89
Cornerstone, a Christian religious group at the University of Missouri at Kansas
City, found itself in 1977 suddenly unable to meet in university buildings, which it had
done for the prior four years. The exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted by the
Board of Curators in 1972 that prohibits the use of university buildings or grounds "for
purposes of religious worship of religious teaching." Eleven student members of
Cornerstone brought suit, alleging that their First Amendment rights were infringed upon
with respect to freedom of speech and exercise of religion.
Missouri’s chief claim against Cornerstone was that the university has a
compelling interest in maintaining strict separation of church and state, citing the
“Establishment Clauses” of both the Federal and Missouri Constitutions. A three-pronged
test, however, had been set as precedent, which the U.S. Supreme Court utilized in
making a determination on whether the religious group’s involvement with the university
offended the Establishment Clause:
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1. The governmental policy must have a secular legislative purpose.
2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.
3. The policy must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion.
Both the District Court and Court of Appeals agreed that the first and third prongs
of the test are substantially met. However, as the university and District Court argued,
allowing a religious group to share the limited public forum would have the “primary
effect” or advancing religion. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, ruled in Justice
Powell’s opinion that the nature of the case is misconceived and that by prohibiting a
religious group from using facilities equally open to other students and organizations, the
school was censoring said group based on the content of its speech. While the Court
recognized that religious groups would indeed receive benefit from using university
facilities, “incidental” benefits do not constitute promotion of religion any more than they
would hypothetically be promoting one political view over the other. The Court ruled that
state governments and universities have no need to go beyond constitutionally
appropriate standards to ensure separation of church and State, and affirmed the Court of
Appeals’ finding.
UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin90
On the heels of racial incidents at the University of Wisconsin system in the midto late 1980s, the Board of Regents crafted a “Design for Diversity” plan in 1988
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designed to quell tensions and show its commitment to multi-cultural understanding. The
board also developed a “Policy and Guidelines on Racist and Discriminatory Conduct”
and a rule, UWS 17.06, by which administrators could punish students for the following
items:
1. For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior
directed at an individual or on separate occasions at different individuals, or
for physical conduct, if such comments, epithets or other expressive behavior
or physical conduct intentionally:
A. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individuals; and
B. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education,
university-related work, or other university-authorized activity.
2. Whether the intent required under the first provision is present shall be
determined by consideration of all relevant circumstances.
The rule proceeded to provide a number of examples wherein a student would be
found in violation of this rule, including “He or she intentionally made demeaning
remarks to an individual based on that person's ethnicity, such as name calling, racial
slurs, or ‘jokes’;” and “His or her purpose was to make the educational environment
hostile for the person in whose quarters or work area the material was placed.”91 A
student would not be in violation, though, if he or she expressed adverse opinions in a
classroom, because those opinions would not be directed specifically at one individual
and there would be no proof of intent to produce a hostile environment.
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By the time a federal district court heard this case, at least nine students had been
disciplined under the rule. Among the examples provided by the court was the case of a
student who was placed on permanent probation and ordered to receive psychological
counseling for yelling, “You’ve got nice tits!” and another student who told an Asian
American that “It’s people like you – that’s the reason this country is so screwed up” and
“You don’t belong here.”92
The plaintiffs, members of the UW-Milwaukee’s newspaper, the UWM Post, and
others brought suit against the system, claiming that the rule violated the First
Amendment. The Board of Regents, on the other hand, argued it was constitutional under
the fighting words provision, which was established primarily in the Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire case in 1942,93 and that it parallels laws similar to those governing workplace
environments. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prevents employers from
“discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his … conditions or privileges of
employment because of such individual’s race, religion, sex or national origin.”94
Juxtaposed with speech code policies, Title VII does indeed look quite similar.
The judges did ruled though, that Title VII addresses employment settings exclusively,
and is irrelevant to this case.
The district court found that racial epithets did not meet the fighting words
scrutiny that had been more narrowly tailored since Chaplinsky, and that their utterance
was unlikely to cause a breach of the peace. While saying “nigger” to an African
American may be likely to incite him or her to violence, the definitions of the UW rule
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covered more situations than would likely cause an immediate breach of peace. The U.S.
Supreme ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that:
The problems of bigotry and discrimination sought to be addressed here
are real and truly corrosive of the educational environment. But freedom
of speech is almost absolute in our land and the only restriction the
fighting words doctrine can abide is that based on the fear of violent
reaction.95
Dambrot v. Central Michigan University96
The first university speech code case decided by an appellate court involved Keith
Dambrot, the white 1992-93 Central Michigan University basketball coach who used a
racial epithet in the locker room during a game either at halftime or post game. Dambrot,
whose squad was on the losing end of the contest, asked his team (which was made up of
11 African Americans and three Caucasians) if it were “okay for [him] to use the ‘NWord.’” After his team implied it was permissible, Dambrot proceeded to call various
members of the team and coaching squad – white and black – “niggers.” He also
suggested “We need more niggers” on the team. His definition of the word, he said, was
that a player was hard-nosed, tough, gritty, etc., and that he simply used the word – with
the players’ apparent permission – as the team members frequently did throughout
practices and games.
The school’s athletic director, Dave Keilitz, interviewed the players about the
incident, and they said they were not offended by Dambrot’s comments, though one
player complained to the school’s affirmative action officer a time after the interviews
took place. Dambrot was suspended for five games for violating the school’s
discriminatory harassment policy. Once word got out to the campus community of the
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locker room event, the students demonstrated, and national media reported on Dambrot’s
transgression. He was then informed he would not return for the following season and
was released, and he instituted a lawsuit against the university, claiming on First
Amendment grounds that utterance of the word “nigger” was not sufficient grounds for
firing. Several members of the basketball team joined their coach in the lawsuit. CMU’s
discriminatory harassment policy defined racial and ethnic harassment as:
[A]ny intentional, unintentional, physical, verbal, or nonverbal behavior
that subjects an individual to an intimidating, hostile or offensive
educational, employment or living environment by ... (c) demeaning or
slurring individuals through ... written literature because of their racial or
ethnic affiliation; or (d) using symbols, [epithets] or slogans that infer
negative connotations about the individual's racial or ethnic affiliation.97
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals struck this policy down, saying that it was
purposely sweeping and vague to include as much speech and conduct as possible. The
policy also reached a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech. CMU
argued that the policy was indeed constitutional because there was no enforcement
mechanism, and it was applied only in circumstances wherein the First Amendment was
not effectual, but was vague on what exactly those circumstances entailed. The court
rejected this defense, stating that regardless of intent, the university would be able to
subjectively censor nearly any desired opinion. Judge Damon Keith wrote that:
Though some statements might be seen as universally offensive, different
people find different things offensive… Several players testified they were
not offended by Dambrot's use of the N-word while student Norris and
affirmative action officer Haddad were extremely offended… Defining
what is offensive is, in fact, wholly delegated to university officials. This
"unrestricted delegation of power" gives rise to the second type of
vagueness. For these reasons, the CMU policy is also void for
vagueness.98
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McCauley v. University of the Virgin Islands99
One of the more recent examples of the courts’ dealings with university speech
codes on university campuses today, McCauley provides an examination into
constitutionally suspect policies currently on the books at institutions of higher learning
around the nation. Today’s policies generally put emphasis on “harassment.” In 2005,
UVI student Stephen McCauley ventured to a beach with two of his classmates, who
soon thereafter engaged in a sexual act. The next day, the female of the group charged the
male with rape. After learning of the charge, McCauley visited the female, Jenna
Piasecki, repeatedly over the course of the next month to discuss the charge. Piasecki
complained to administration that McCauley had harassed her, and UVI officials
repeatedly told McCauley to refrain from contacting Piasecki. In November of that year,
McCauley was charged with violating the Student Code of Conduct, which prohibited:
Committing, conspiring to commit, or causing to be committed any act
which causes or is likely to cause serious physical or mental harm or
which tends to injure or actually injures, frightens, demeans, degrades or
disgraces any person. This includes but is not limited to violation of the
University policies on hazing, sexual harassment or sexual assault.
It also prohibited “offensive” or “unauthorized” signs and conduct causing
“emotional distress.”
Shortly after the charge, McCauley filed suit against UVI and administrators for
violating his First Amendment rights and freedom of association. He was shortly
thereafter criminally charged with witness tampering, and university proceedings were
placed on hold until 2009 until completion of the criminal investigation, when a charge of
violating UVI’s drug and alcohol policy was added to the initial complaint. He was
ordered to write a letter of apology to Piasecki and pay $200.
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The district court had previously invalidated the policy as constitutionally
overbroad in McCauley’s suit, but allowed two other policies to remain intact despite
comparing precedent and court decisions regarding university speech rights to those of K12 students. In this case, the court struck down the two remaining policies as flawed,
writing that “desire to protect the listener cannot be convincingly trumpeted as a basis for
censoring speech for university students.”100 Additional reasons for striking down the
policies included prohibition of conduct causing “emotional distress,” wherein the court
opined that literally every phrase made by a student has capacity to subjectively cause
another emotional distress. The court said “substantial” damage to free speech is
committed with this and similar policies on the books. The Third Circuit also confirmed
that it is not appropriate for universities to treat their students as children, and that
“[p]ublic universities have significantly less leeway in regulating student speech than
public elementary or high schools.”101
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Chapter Four – EXAMPLES OF SPEECH CENSORSHIP BY UNIVERSITIES IN
RECENT YEARS
The vast majority of instances wherein students or faculty are punished by
universities do not reach courtrooms. Instead, infractions are met by attention and bad
publicity from students, national and local media and advocacy groups, like FIRE or the
American Civil Liberties Union. The following universities were selected as a
representation of the variety of potential First Amendment offenses committed against
faculty and students. While not a comprehensive list, these examples provide insight and
discussion into the common types of free speech incidents occurring in the modern
academic environment, what the response is from the aforementioned groups, and how
the instances are concluded.
University of Alabama
The University of Alabama in 2003 banned university dorm window displays
after a Confederate flag was hung in Byrd Hall, home to students in the Mallet Assembly
honors program. Residential Life administration ordered the flag removed, but the faculty
in residence for the dorm, Byron White, refused to do so. He argued that adorning
windows in a residence hall was one of the constitutionally protected methods by which
students were able to express themselves, whether it be a poster of a favorite band or, in
this case, a controversial flag.
“While fighting for the right to display a Confederate flag is controversial and
makes many people nervous, a blanket denial of rights by the university is a much less
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tenable position for them, and a lot more people are willing to fight it," White told The
Tuscaloosa News.102
Officials claimed, however, that the ban was not for the removal of the
Confederate flag per se, but that window expressions by one student living in a
community could portray all members of that community as endorsing it. Residential Life
Director Lisa Skelton said the policy was created to give students an opportunity to
define what is overly offensive, and that the majority of students supported the ban.103
White countered that students in a community should be able to discuss among
themselves what is and is not appropriate without university intervention or creation of
subjective rules. 104
Though no student was specifically prosecuted, and it was technically legal for
UA to ban all window displays at the time the policy was enacted, Residential Life’s
action poorly taught students about their rights and guarantees of the First Amendment.
The policy was suspended at the beginning of the school year105 and was later tabled
indefinitely. 106
The next year, the University of Alabama administration again infringed the First
Amendment rights of campus community members, this time against a faculty group. The
Alabama Scholars Association, a conservative-leaning branch of the National Association
of Scholars, was cut off from using the low-cost campus mailing system after creating
102
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and mailing a newsletter, The Alabama Observer, critical of the supposed grade inflation
at UA and calling for term limits of faculty. ASA says its sudden ban from the system is
in retaliation for the content of the newsletter.107
UA Provost Judy Bonner replied that ASA’s removal from the low-cost system
was not because of the content of the newsletter, but because the group distributed to
places outside the university. David Beito, co-president of ASA, defended his
organization, telling Alabama’s student newspaper, The Crimson White, that,
“[University administration] will do anything to silence criticism. The University
administration does not want to be criticized, and we are considered traitors because we
don’t promote University public relations.”108 He noted that another group, the Coalition
for Diversity and Inclusiveness, employs non-UA members, mails outside the community
and is still included in the low-cost system. Marten Utlee, campus contact for the
American Association of University Professors, which was also included in the removal
from the mailing system, called the university’s decision an “attempt to tax the
expression of certain ideas.” 109
All too convenient, it seems for UA, to sanction ASA immediately after the
critical newsletter was published. Administrators soon backtracked, and said the real
reason ASA was removed was because it was not a “bona fide” organization. However,
no system is in place at UA for a faculty organization to become “bona fide.” No press
release or media coverage ever announced the outcome of the dispute between ASA and
UA.
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The University of Alabama’s tendencies toward censorship continued the next
year, when the Faculty Senate created a “hate speech” policy condemning discriminatory
speech and advising UA administration to forbid sponsored speakers from making racist,
sexist, ethnic or homophobic statements after a comedian made jokes at a performance
“derogatory of gay persons.”110 University officials, in this instance, seemed to have
forgotten that comedy has long been noted for pushing the boundaries of civility. In the
resolution, the Faculty Senate “recognizes that the right to freedom of speech is not
absolute and is subject to both legal restrictions and standards of civility,” and as such,
“the University of Alabama has a duty reflected both in law and in standards of civility to
control behavior which demeans or reduces an individual based on group affiliation or
personal characteristics, or which promotes hate or discrimination, in all formal programs
and activities.”111 Again, the Senate has implied that the First Amendment does not
protect speech that does not meet the “standards of civility” and that speech subjectively
or ambiguously labeled “uncivil” should be censored and punished.
At a UA Law conference, FIRE founder Harvey Silverglate condemned the
speech codes, saying that, “[These people] think they are fighting the good fight. They
claim that they are fighting for the underdog, equal treatment, that they are fighting
racism, sexism and homophobia, when, in fact, they are not fighting those evils at all.
They are fighting for the destruction of a free society.”112 UA Faculty Senate President
John Mason countered that free speech is not banned, but that offensive content is
110
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unwelcome. “I don’t care if people go out to the Quad or any other area and say wherever
they want,” he said. “I just don’t want the University to pay for [hate speech].”113 As
before, while declining to employ persons for entertainment that some may find offensive
is not necessarily constitutionally suspect, including in contracts censorship – selfimposed or otherwise – and the promise not to offend sets a bad example for expectations
and learning how to deal with offensive content. It also creates a slippery slope to
prohibition of other topics and further restrictions on speech, not to mention stifles the
intrinsic qualities and traditions of comedy.
Surprisingly, the University of Alabama Student Senate came up with a resolution
of its own to combat the Faculty Senate’s. In February 2005, the Student Senate
unanimously passed a free speech resolution, which stated that “[f]ree speech is
absolutely vital to the mission of any university, where new and often controversial ideas
must be discussed openly and rationally in order to make advances in knowledge” and
proclaimed that “[b]y defending free speech for all students, one in no way condones any
kind of hate or intolerance; [o]n the contrary, one is promoting tolerance of others despite
their differences, especially their differences of opinion.”114 This resolution by the
Student Senate is a rare and bold move by students to reject restrictions created by
university higher-ups and preserve freedom.
University of Central Florida
Speech at the University of Central Florida is only permissible at certain areas,
according to UCF policies. In 2006, an anti-Iraq war protest was held on campus by
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members of the Students for a Democratic Society and broken up by police because the
students had gathered outside approved “free-assembly zones.” UCF senior Patrick
DeCarlo, a student present at the protest, filed a grievance against the university and
argued that the scene of about 40 protestors was neither loud, violent or obtrusive. “It was
shocking to see UCF police come out and say, ‘You have to leave or you’re going to be
arrested for trespassing,’” he said to the Daytona Beach News-Journal. “We pay to go
there. We know the public university is supposed to be a marketplace of ideas, not
injustice.”115 In an all-too-rare demonstration against censorship, the UCF Student Senate
also passed a pro-First Amendment resolution, noting that creation and enforcement of
such zones are hostile to free speech purposes and create a chilling effect.
The policy explicitly stated that only four areas on campus were allotted as “free
speech zones,” wherein students could protest or hold some semblance of assembly. The
rule stated that the protests could not cause “interference…in the best interests of the
University,” which would be defined and applied on a case-by-case basis by the
university president or another designee.116 The policy was upgraded a year later to
shrink the size of the aforementioned zones, and include provisions on sound monitoring,
wherein “it must not be of such a volume that would excessively and unnecessarily
interfere with the actions of members of the UCF community or those neighborhoods
surrounding the campus.” A university official, who would have to be paid for by the
protesting organization, would be on-hand at all times to monitor volume.117 UCF’s
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policy remains in effect to date. The 1989 U.S. Supreme Ward v. Rock Against Racism is
relevant to this example, as the Supreme Court ruled that there is significant government
interest in regulating noise, as long as it is content neutral,118 though it could be argued
ulterior motives could be at stake here, regardless.
The mid-2000s began to pose another question of constitutionality when social
media sites like Facebook.com gained traction in the university setting. In 2005, at a time
when Facebook users were required to have an .edu email address to register for a profile,
University of Central Florida student Matthew Walston created a Facebook group titled
“Students Against Victor Perez,” with a description that read “Victor Perez is a jerk and a
fool.” Perez, a fellow student running for student government, filed a complaint about
Walston to the Office of Student Conduct, and Walston was charged with “personal
abuse” and “harassment” and set to proceed through the Student Conduct Review
process.119
Walston contacted FIRE for advice and representation, and the organization wrote
UCF and explained that the charge “not only trivializes actual harassment by equating it
with language that is simply opinionated, but also chills expression on UCF’s campus and
ignores constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech.”120 Walston was found “not in
violation” of personal abuse. This case, though not reaching any level of the court
system, nonetheless exemplifies the extent to which some universities will monitor
student activity to monitor decency and punish those who offend. As social media
becomes a more primary means of communication for young adults, this instance serves
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as an example – and hopefully some sort of standard – for rejecting university officials’
overreach.
Universities’ sanctions are not exclusive to students or organizations, as in the
case of Hyung-il Jung, a professor of hospitality management at the University of Central
Florida. While teaching a class of about 25 students in a hospitality management
accounting class in 2013, Jung witnessed the pained look on a number of faces during a
review, and joked, “This question is very difficult. It looks like you guys are being slowly
suffocated by these questions. Am I on a killing spree or what?'"121 Though most students
allegedly laughed with the professor and later said they understood the context of the
remark, one student complained to administration.
Jung was placed on paid administrative leave, was banned from campus,
prohibited from contacting any students and required to take and pass a psychiatric exam
before being allowed to return to his duties. 122 Granted, Jung admits he could have
selected a different word, especially on the heels of UCF police stopping what appeared
to be plans by a UCF student to carry out a mass slaying on campus. However, as many
aforementioned examples here argue, bad taste is nonetheless protected by the First
Amendment, and UCF administrators flexing their might over what is fairly apparent to
be a poorly timed joke is a gratuitous overreach in interpreting freedom of speech. The
university received multiple emails from Jung’s students supporting him and explaining
his comments were taken out of context, and a petition to reinstate him circulated on
campus. Campus, media and advocacy groups’ uproar aided Jung, it appears, and the
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professor was reinstated a couple of weeks later, without having to complete the mental
health examination.123
University of Colorado at Boulder
In 2004, an effort to satirically explain university affirmative action policies was
faced with threats of censorship at the University of Colorado at Boulder. CU’s College
Republicans and Equal Opportunity Alliance, along with Republican state senator Ed
Jones, made plans to host an “affirmative action bake sale” on campus with prices that
they believe reflected racial discrimination congruent with race-based acceptance policy
in college admissions and hiring. Baked goods were priced at $1 for white and Asian
students, 50 cents for Latinos, 25 cents for African Americans and free for Native
Americans. 124"My background should not define my ability to succeed, and I refuse to
see the color of my skin as an obstacle that needs to be accounted for by others," Jones
told The Colorado Daily. "While I do agree that disadvantaged students often need a
helping hand, I refuse to define that category of students based on skin color."
Despite College Republicans Chair Brad Jones saying that the point of the bake
sale was to foster discussion and make a statement about a perceived injustice and not to
make money, CU Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs Ron Stump cited Colorado General
Statute 24-34-60 and the 1964 Civil Rights Act as laws the sale would infringe on, as one
cannot offer goods or services at varying rates to customers based on race.125 The Student
Affairs Office ordered the bake sale to halt, and Robert Corry, CU’s College
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Republicans’ attorney, quickly threatened to take the university to court to protect the
students’ First Amendment rights.126
Undoubtedly looking to avoid the negative press and the financial burden of a
lawsuit, CU and the College Republicans reached a compromise with the bake sale:
prices would be fixed, but a “suggested donation” that varies based on race is
permissible. "We're glad the university has backed off of its anti-First Amendment
stance," said Jessica Peck Corry, director of the Campus Accountability Project, an
advocacy group associated with the campus Republicans. “These students are clearly
using political satire to demonstrate the evils of racial preferences. They aren't trying to
make money, but rather draw awareness to the issue at hand.”127
Angry students formed a mob and surrounded the protestors, blocked their
demonstration, vandalized their display and physically jostled members of the College
Republicans.128 In this case, we see the interesting paradigm frequently witnessed when
“the wrong opinion” is displayed on campus. The university offered no protection for the
students and did not threaten to punish the protestors for intimidation. This appears to
reinforce the notion that the university does not protect speech it does not approve of in
the first place. While the College Republicans’ speech could potentially pass as
incitement not protected by the Constitution, it could be hypothesized that a liberal
definition of “offensive speech,” coupled with encouragement from administrators or
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other organizations in power, would be enough to drive the mob to take action beyond
what a reasonable, objective person would pursue.
No discussion of First Amendment rights at the University of Colorado at Boulder
would be complete without discussion of a pair of incidents involving former professor
Ward Churchill. Churchill wrote an infamous essay in 2003 titled “Some People Push
Back: On the Justice of Roosting Chickens,” wherein he called victims of the September
11, 2001, terrorist attack “Little Eichmanns,” after Nazi holocaust bureaucrat Adoph
Eichmann, and insinuated that America deserved the attacks and needed more like
them.129 The vast majority of Americans who read the piece were offended at Churchill’s
extreme view, and Churchill stepped down from his position as CU ethnic studies chair in
early 2005.130 A couple of days later, the CU Board of Regents issued a statement:
“Within the next 30 days, the Office of the Chancellor will launch and oversee a thorough
examination of Professor Churchill’s writings, speeches, tape recordings and other
works,” to determine whether Churchill’s conduct, including speech, was valid for
dismissal under the First Amendment. Churchill was also accused of academic fraud, but
to remain consistent and focused, that part of the case will not be discussed at length.131
In a letter to the CU Board of Regents, FIRE president Greg Lukianoff referenced
numerous court precedents, including the previously discussed Papish and Sweezy, as
prohibiting Churchill’s removal for the content of his speech. He also reiterated that all
forms of speech should be protected, even those that the community at large finds
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supremely abhorrent. Lukianoff writes, “[W]hatever contempt I may have for Professor
Churchill’s opinions, I believe it would be tragic if this incident were allowed to erode
one of the most beautiful and fundamental principles of American society: free
speech.”132
In March of that year, the faculty committee that reviews misconduct at the
University of Colorado at Boulder decided not to punish Churchill for the content of his
2003 essay full of anti-American sentiments. He would, however, continue to be under
investigation for his allegations of plagiarism and other academic misconduct.133 It is
important to note, however, that though while plagiarism is never legally protected, the
query into Churchill’s academic integrity seems to have been a direct result of his
controversial speech, and that sufficient “dirt” needed to be found by CU administration
before they could legally terminate him.
In 2007, by an 8-1 vote, the CU Board of Regents terminated Ward Churchill on
the basis of plagiarism, fabrication, improper citation and falsification, after an
investigative committee released a 124-page document on Churchill’s misconduct.134 The
litigious journey was just beginning, for Churchill, however, and he sued the University
of Colorado at Boulder for wrongful termination, arguing that he was actually being fired
because of his unpopular speech. A parallel used by Churchill’s colleague asked, “If a
police officer didn’t like a car’s bumper sticker, could the officer pull over the driver for
speeding if the driver truly was speeding?”135 The Colorado Supreme Court upheld
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previous decisions that Churchill’s firing was legal and not as a result of constitutionally
protected speech. In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court denied to hear his appeal.136
This wasn’t the only time Ward Churchill was involved with a First Amendment
issue at the University of Colorado at Boulder. In 2009, he was slated to appear at a
speech on campus sponsored by Students for True Academic Freedom, the Student
Environmental Action Coalition and 180 Degree Shift at the 11th Hour, with former
Weather Underground member Bill Ayers.137 To assuage the higher cost of security for
the controversial event, CU notified the speakers and their sponsors after the event that
they would bill $2,200 for security at the event, saw little disruption.138 Left unchecked,
this would effectively allow CU to charge organizations strange fees as a tax on speech
that could be controversial, unpopular or unwelcome. FIRE again got involved, and
president Greg Lukianoff wrote the school, saying, “Charging for extra security because
of a potentially hostile audience grants the most disruptive or violent hecklers a veto over
controversial events and creates an incentive for that kind of behavior. It’s also
unconstitutional at a public college or university.”139 Facing media scrutiny and
additional lawsuit threats from Churchill, CU administration agreed to absorb the costs of
security.140
University of California at Los Angeles
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Six years after Matthew Walston came under university sanctions at the
University of Central Florida for his post on Facebook, a student at the University of
California at Los Angeles faced a similar media scandal for her dealings with social
media – though by 2011, the Internet outrage machine on YouTube was more advanced
than private Facebook groups in 2005, and bigoted speech on social media routinely
makes national news.
UCLA student Alexandra Wallace posted a two-and-a-half minute video rant on
YouTube about Asian students talking loudly on their cell phones in the library and
inviting their extended families to shop, cook and do laundry at Wallace’s apartment
complex.141 The video quickly gained traction, and Wallace removed the video from her
site, though copies were available to view at various places around the Internet.
UCLA chancellor Gene Block wrote in an email to students, “I am appalled by
the thoughtless and hurtful comments of a UCLA student posted on YouTube. Speech
that expresses intolerance toward any group of people … is indefensible and has no place
at UCLA.”142 Dean of students Robert Naples called Wallace’s video “beyond
distasteful,” which indeed it was, but then followed that statement with, “We’ll be taking
a look at the language that she uses in the video to see if it violates any codes under the
student code, perhaps regarding harassment.”143
Wallace apologized to the campus community in a statement, and reported that
she was receiving death threats from people who were offended by the video, and she
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notified campus police, who advised her on precautions to take to stay safe in what had
become a hostile environment. She also had to reschedule her finals for that semester.144
On hearing of Wallace receiving death threats, Naples commented that “If she’s received
a death threat, I find that as deplorable as her original YouTube video. If this is the
response of students on campus, we’ve got a lot of work to do.”145 What is really
deplorable here is that Naples is comfortable with equating death threats – true
harassment not constitutionally protected – with speech someone merely found distasteful
or offensive. As expected, though, Wallace was the one investigated while no further
look was taken into those who threatened her.
The Los Angeles Times reported that UCLA’s conduct code “prohibits students
from making threats and bans racial or sexual harassment so severe or pervasive that it
impairs another's participation in campus life.”146 This code, like others, could be
bolstered by a stronger definition of “so severe or pervasive.” The policy could be more
permissible if it included the essence of United States v. O'Brien,147 which established the
need for substantial governmental interest in censoring speech. However, the content of
Wallace’s rant aligned more with speech containing a distasteful opinion, rather than a
true threat likely to make thousands of Asian students fear for their wellbeing.
Thusly, UCLA administration declined to find the code inappropriate. It did,
however, decide Wallace’s video did not infringe the code, and the investigation against
her ceased. She did drop out of school, though, due to the death threats. Fighting
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offensive speech or incorrect opinions with other speech is certainly permissible and
encouraged, as many students and community members did with their “response” videos
to Wallace’s on YouTube. If she had dropped out because of her regret or embarrassment
over the video, that would be one thing, but when she is run off campus in fear for her
safety, discourse and free speech have failed.
A couple of years prior to Alexandra Wallace’s case, the University of California
at Los Angeles employed a different method in attempt to quell protected speech by a
discontented student. In 2009, UCLA graduate student Tom Wilde created a website,
ucla-weeding101.com (which is no longer active in 2014), documenting his removal from
the Graduate School of Education.148 Wilde claimed that he was dismissed for speech
critical of the university, though the university claimed that he was removed due to low
grades. Advisers for Wilde, however, confirmed that some of his grades were improperly
recorded.149
After the website was created, Wilde received a letter from senior campus counsel
Patricia Jasper, which said the website address was “trademark infringement and
dilution” and that “commercial use of any of the names of the University of California” is
“a criminal offense under California Education Code, §92000.” UCLA also said it needed
to protect its reputation, and that Wilde’s poorly designed site could be confused as one
of UCLA’s own.150 Jasper demanded Wilde take the website down. Not completely in
compliance, Wilde included a disclaimer at the bottom of his page, which said
“Disclaimer: This site is not supported, endorsed, or authorized by UCLA or the
148
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University of California. The inclusion of "UCLA" in the domain name and site content
is solely for the purposes of identifying this public university.”151
Wilde contacted FIRE for help, which in a letter to Chancellor Gene Block said
that it was nearly impossible for anyone to mistake Wilde’s creation for an official
website by the university. Soon thereafter, Jasper responded that the disclaimer now
included on the site would be sufficient, and that the investigation was concluded.152
UCLA’s claim likely would have been laughed out of the courts as well, as simply
mentioning a trademark name is hardly an offense, especially when it is used in comment
or critique.
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Chapter Five – CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
Free speech at American universities, in academia, and, potentially, for all
citizens could be in its twilight years. As more students attend college, institutions of
higher learning play an ever-broadening role in shaping societal norms. According to the
National Center for Education Statistics, the number of undergraduate students in the
nation was 17.7 million in 2012, an increase of 48 percent from 1990 and of 37 percent
from 2000 to 2010. Enrollment is supposed to jump to 20.2 million students by 2023.153
If the tendencies at many major universities continue, or become even more restrictive,
free speech and the First Amendment faces a serious threat. Alarming too, is that many
students seem not to care. Mindless partisanship, uncritical thinking, and glorified echo
chambers are the antithesis of what universities should be. As FIRE cofounder Alan
Charles Kors says, “A nation that does not educate in liberty will not long preserve it and
will not even know when it is lost.”154
In order for the best ideas to prevail, all thoughts and opinions should be allowed
and encouraged in our quest to better find truth. Elitist definitional establishment of
allowed viewpoints does nothing but create a culture of assimilation, parroting of beliefs
and belief in the authority to challenge and punish people who are different. By
rewarding groupthink, punishing devil’s advocates and shutting down discussion of
important and relevant social and political topics, universities are doing exactly what
they’re supposed to prevent.
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Outrage is often a legitimate feeling, but that outrage can be turned into
inspiration to learn, to teach and to spend time considering an alternate viewpoint. The
Constitution does not guarantee the right to keep individuals from being offended, though
some people have found the ability to harness outrage to easily manipulate others into
taking action or censoring others. When a culture of professional outrage is involved,
accusations may as well be convictions wherein no legal innocence is sufficient.
The primary argument for the acceptance of speech codes is that universities and
the government have a substantial interest in creating an environment where students feel
comfortable. However, comfort is not necessarily constitutionally guaranteed (with
exceptions on being threatened) when the First Amendment rights of others are being
infringed. Epithets and offensive speech are not mutually exclusive; the mere utterance of
one does not automatically infer the other. A person who makes a distasteful joke using
the word “faggot” is not also advocating for harm to homosexuals. Neither, for that
matter, is saying that “faggots should be hit,” as the Supreme Court has ruled in
Brandenburg v. Ohio that an actual threat must be made rather than just advocacy of
harm. The same standard of threatening speech should be applied evenly across the
board, not at a heightened state merely because one references someone different than his
or her own preferences or genetic makeup. While arguing that decent, polite speech is
necessary to the discourse hypothetically typical of an institution of higher learning to
create substantial interest, simultaneously stifling unpopular opinions erodes discourse
socially far beyond communities at the college level, thusly eroding the state of free
speech.
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A “model” university speech policy that is both accepted by students and
administration while remaining constitutionally guaranteed would be an extensive – and
perhaps futile – undertaking. This code would have to include solely provisions against
speech so pervasive that it ceases to be mere speech, and then laws beyond the scope of
the First Amendment are broken regardless. The speech would have to be content neutral,
as discussed in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, and could not be regulated simply because
it is unpopular. The rules themselves, as well as the punishments attached to them, would
have to be well-defined, easily accessible and easily understood. Hiding them in an
obscure manual with ambiguous terms of agreement does a disservice to due process and
must be readily available to set the tone for what will be legally tolerated. Though Cohen
v. California did not specifically reference learning institutions, it was found that overly
vague prohibitions on speech – like those that research suggests are common in
university speech policies – are impermissible.
The information, examples and discussion provided in this thesis could be
bolstered and defined by additional information. A call for further research is necessary
to continue to assess the landscape of speech codes at American universities, so that
potential damages to freedom may be assessed and remedied. The research opportunities
I recommend to foster additional comprehension of speech codes are as follows:
1. Number of unreported incidents of university administration punishing
students for speech.
Essentially all cases the public is aware of involving sanctions against a student or
faculty member for speech were brought into the open because the affected student
reported it to the media or advocacy groups. However, how many students are unaware of
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their rights, their ability to appeal, or the resources available in other venues to assist
them with justice? How many students simply accept their punishment, or believe that
they are truly guilty of a crime for their speech? A multitude of universities’ records
would have to be extensively examined to determine this number of dismissed students.
2. Reputation of universities enacting codes.
As previously discussed in the second chapter, Jon Gould conducted a survey in
the 1990s that found the more prestigious the university, the more likely they were to
employ speech codes. These universities typically “had experience anti-apartheid protest,
maintained black or minority studies departments, sponsored gay/lesbian organizations,
and enrolled graduate students and full-time undergraduates.” He concluded that only
approximately nine percent of universities actually did have unconstitutional codes, a
much lower rate than FIRE claimed.155 Today, though, nearly every major university
could claim the qualities Gould said applied to “prestigious” universities in his study.
Perhaps with these qualities applied again 20 years after the previous study, FIRE and
Gould’s statistics would more accurately align. Learning what types of universities are
creating and enforcing codes as well as the number and scope of policies is paramount to
correct advocating for change.
3. How much influence does prior education have on First Amendment
expectations?
Despite the ruling in McCauley differentiating speech freedoms at the college
level and that of K-12 programs, the two institutions still have bearing on each other.
Though the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1969 that children do not lose their First
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Amendment privileges when they enter school,156 public schools regardless have more
leeway than universities at regulating speech. As previously stated, a majority of students
entering their first year at college is unaware of the First Amendment provisions designed
for protecting them. Further research may suggest that complacency is instilled in these
students through approximately 13 years of heavy-handed regulation of speech. By the
time young adulthood is reached, students expect uncomfortable speech to be regulated –
and will advocate for its regulation. A further look into the role high school plays on First
Amendment expectations is necessary to examine educational opportunities on student
rights.
4. What are the attitudes toward free speech and hate speech on campus?
Do students want restrictions?
Jon Gould and others talk about administrators refusing to abide by court
decisions finding speech codes unconstitutional, but instead even creating offending ones.
It could be suggested that the majority of students actually want these codes, that so many
feel similarly about racist speech, for example, and actually want to punish those who use
it regardless of legality. A nationwide survey of college students evaluating examples of
offensive speech and remarking whether they believe the speaker should be punished
would be useful in developing this statistic.
5. How aware are students that speech codes exist, and can they interpret
them and their First Amendment rights?
Legalese can be difficult to understand, even for an educated person. This is
especially true in a time when much focus in childhood education is on testing, placement
and grades rather than understanding civic duties and guaranteed rights. Because codes
156
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are usually selectively and rarely enforced at any given university, how much of the
student body is aware they exist? Almost certainly, a fraternity brother making a joke
about Jews to his roommate behind closed doors is unlikely to result in expulsion.
However, what happens when the same joke is made in the dining hall and is overheard?
An updated survey on how familiar students are with the technical ins and outs of the
First Amendment – and subsequently their rights in the face of punishment for expression
at the university level – can aid scholars in getting a grasp on how influential education
on the Constitution could be.
6. Is it too late?
Of course, all these measures will be for naught if academia has already ventured
too far down the rabbit hole. If speech codes have become the pervasive, omnipresent
culture at universities, anything but substantial and severe decisions and interpretations
from the U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely to achieve any difference. With statistical
assistance from the previously mentioned studies, a qualitative study into the efficacy,
overall state and future of freedom of speech can be assessed. Ultimately, though the
future of these and similar speech codes and policies, both on campus and in the public
arena, depends on what rulings the courts will make. Will they find that there is an
unquestionable and undeniable need to abolish speech codes, effectively eliminating the
adversarial kangaroo courts apt to prosecute students and faculty for expression or
opinions? Or will the First Amendment see serious revision, repeal or change in
interpretation in the coming decades?
As in argument, debate and politicking to find truth or a pinnacle attitude of
society, centuries of scholars and reason have suggested one method is most righteous
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and fair: open exchange of ideas. The future and efficacy of the First Amendment lies
with the next couple of generations. Will freedom of expression be preserved and
persevere, or will some speech be found so vulgar it must be outlawed and punished
completely? The stance that our institutions of higher learning take could be the most
meaningful factor in ensuring change is brought about through cultural shifts, not
coercion. Liberty must not be lost by those pledged to teach it.
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